State of New York Public Employment Relations Board Decisions from February 27, 1997 by New York State Public Employment Relations Board
Cornell University ILR School 
DigitalCommons@ILR 
Board Decisions - NYS PERB New York State Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) 
2-27-1997 
State of New York Public Employment Relations Board Decisions 
from February 27, 1997 
New York State Public Employment Relations Board 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/perbdecisions 
Thank you for downloading an article from DigitalCommons@ILR. 
Support this valuable resource today! 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the New York State Public Employment Relations Board 
(PERB) at DigitalCommons@ILR. It has been accepted for inclusion in Board Decisions - NYS PERB by an 
authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@ILR. For more information, please contact catherwood-
dig@cornell.edu. 
If you have a disability and are having trouble accessing information on this website or need materials in an 
alternate format, contact web-accessibility@cornell.edu for assistance. 
State of New York Public Employment Relations Board Decisions from February 
27, 1997 
Keywords 
NY, NYS, New York State, PERB, Public Employment Relations Board, board decisions, labor disputes, 
labor relations 
Comments 
This document is part of a digital collection provided by the Martin P. Catherwood Library, ILR School, 
Cornell University. The information provided is for noncommercial educational use only. 
This article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/perbdecisions/468 
STATE OF MEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
STATE OF NEW YORK (GOVERNOR'S OFFICE OF 
EMPLOYEE RELATIONS), 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-17851 
NEW YORK STATE POLICE INVESTIGATORS 
ASSOCIATION, 
Respondent. 
WALTER J. PELLEGRINI, GENERAL COUNSEL (RICHARD W. MCDOWELL 
of counsel), for Charging Party 
BLITMAN & KING LLP (JULES L. SMITH and KENNETH L. WAGNER Of 
counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the New York 
State Police Investigators Association (NYSPIA) to a decision by 
an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on a charge filed by the State 
of New York (Governor's Office of Employee Relations)(State). 
The State alleges that NYSPIA violated §209-a.2(b) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it included demands in 
its petition for compulsory interest arbitration which are not 
arbitrable pursuant to §209.4(e) of the Act. 
Section 209.4(e) of the Act provides as follows: 
With regard to members of any organized unit of 
investigators, senior investigators and investigator 
specialists of the division of state police, the 
provisions of this section shall only apply to the 
terms of collective bargaining agreements directly 
relating to compensation, including but not limited to, 
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salary, stipends, location pay, insurance, medical and 
hospitalization benefits; and shall not apply to non-
compensatory issues including, but not limited to, job 
security, disciplinary procedures and actions, 
deployment or scheduling, or issues relating to 
eligibility for overtime compensation which shall be 
governed by other provisions proscribed [sic]-7 by 
law. 
On a stipulated record, the ALJ held that none of the 
seventeen demands placed in issue under the charge as filed were 
arbitrable within the meaning of §209.4(e) of the Act because 
they were either demands not "directly relating to compensation" 
or demands excluded from the scope of arbitration as "issues 
relating to eligibility for overtime compensation". 
NYSPIA excepts to the ALT's decision as to thirteen of the 
original seventeen demands.^ NYSPIA argues that the demands 
subject to this appeal are all arbitrable pursuant to §209.4(e) 
of the Act and that the ALJ's decision to the contrary 
misinterprets that section. The State argues in response that 
the ALJ gave the correct interpretation to §209.4(e) and his 
decision should be affirmed. 
As the interpretation of §209.4(e) is an issue of first 
impression, we granted the parties oral argument. Having 
reviewed the record and considered the parties7 arguments, we 
affirm the ALJ's decision in part and reverse in part. 
-'should be "prescribed". 
-'NYSPIA took no exception to the ALJ's decision regarding its 
demands for union release time; travel in conjunction with union 
release time; use of State vehicles for commuting to and from 
negotiating sessions and certain union meetings; and outside 
employment. 
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NYSPIA represents the investigators, senior investigators 
and investigator specialists in the Bureau of Criminal 
Investigation (BCI) of the Division of State Police. With the 
enactment of §209.4(e) in August 1995,-7 these BCI employees, 
along with troopers and commissioned and non-commissioned 
officers in the Division of State Police,-7 were for the first 
time afforded a statutory right to have impasses concerning 
certain of their terms and conditions of employment resolved 
through the Act's interest arbitration processes. Prior thereto, 
impasses involving members of the State Police and all other 
covered State employees were resolved, as necessary, by 
imposition of terms by the State Legislature. Members of the 
State Police, however, have a different and a more limited scope 
of statutory interest arbitration than that afforded members of 
other police departments. Since 1974, local police officers and 
their employers may proceed to arbitration in an impasse which 
develops over any mandatory subject of negotiation. Pursuant to 
§209.4(e), members of the State Police and the State may proceed 
to arbitration only in connection with those mandatory subjects 
^lggs N.Y. Laws ch. 447. 
-'1995 N.Y. Laws ch. 432. The troopers and the supervisors are 
in other negotiating units. They, too, are in interest 
arbitration proceedings, but no objections to arbitrability have 
been filed regarding their demands. We reject the State's 
argument that the nature of the demands presented on behalf of 
the troopers or supervisors is relevant to the interpretation of 
§209.4(e). Even assuming their demands are only for increases in 
salary or wage rates, the representatives for the troopers and 
supervisors may have had many reasons for limiting their demands, 
none reflecting an opinion about the meaning of §209.4(e). 
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of negotiation-7 "directly relating to compensation." Impasses 
about subjects which are not arbitrable are still resolved, as 
necessary, by imposition of the State Legislature. 
Before considering NYSPIA's several demands,-7 we outline 
the general framework for our analysis of the scope of 
arbitration under §209.4(e) of the Act. 
We construe the reference in §209.4(e) to "terms of 
collective bargaining agreements" to include both proposals 
pertaining to provisions contained in a current or expired 
collective bargaining agreement and proposals for new terms to be 
added to a successor collective bargaining agreement for the 
first time. Therefore, §209.4(e) applies to all of NYSPIA's 
demands, whether to delete or change terms in the parties' last 
contract or to add new terms. 
The phrase "directly relating to compensation" does not and 
cannot mean, as the AKT held, only "direct compensation" to unit 
employees from the State. First, that interpretation ignores the 
plain language of §209.4(e), which does not refer to "direct 
compensation", but to proposals for contract terms "directly 
relating to compensation." In construing this part of §209.4(e), 
the Legislature's use of the word "compensation" in other 
-
7The thirteen issues presented to us on appeal are mandatory 
subjects of negotiation and the State does not argue to the 
contrary. Only the arbitrability of NYSPIA's demands under 
§209.4(e) is at issue in the case before us. 
-
7The demands in issue are set forth in the attached appendix to 
our decision. 
( 
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subsections of §2 09 is relevant. Sections 209.4(c)(v) a and d 
and 209.5(d)(i), (ii) and (vi) reveal that although the 
Legislature intends "compensation" to cover a wide variety of 
subjects, it also considers there to be a substantive difference 
between "compensation" and "hours",-7 and between "compensation" 
and "direct compensation". Most relevant to our analysis is 
§209.5(d)(ii) of the Act regarding compulsory interest 
arbitration for certain transit employees. In §209.5(d)(ii), the 
Legislature requires the arbitration panel to consider, inter 
alia, the "overall compensation" paid to employees, which 
includes, as a subset, their "direct wage compensation". If, as 
the State urges and the A U held, the Legislature had intended to 
restrict the arbitration available to members of the State Police 
to their "direct compensation", it need only have used in 
§209.4(e) the phrase already existing in another subsection of 
§209 of the Act. 
Second, and perhaps even more persuasive, the interpretation 
of the phrase "directly relating to compensation" urged by the 
State and adopted by the ALT is in irreconcilable conflict with 
certain of the examples listed by the Legislature in §209.4(e) as 
arbitrable subjects. Included specifically as subjects "directly 
relating to compensation" are "insurance, medical and 
hospitalization benefits". These several "benefits" most often 
-''Section 201.4 of the Act, defining the phrase "terms and 
conditions of employment", similarly recognizes a difference 
between "salaries or wages" and "hours". 
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do not involve payments of money by the State directly to an 
employee or from an employee to the State, and they are by nature 
conditional and usually payable to third parties on behalf of the 
employee. 
Just as the State's and the ALJ's interpretation of the 
phrase "directly relating to compensation" is too narrow, 
NYSPIA's argument that §209.4(e) makes arbitrable any subject 
involving pay or benefits given in return for a unit employee's 
services is too broad a reading of that controlling phrase. 
Indeed, NYSPIA argues that §209.4(e) is properly read to 
incorporate the same broad scope of arbitrability available to 
municipal police officers, subject to a narrow exception for a 
few noncompensatory issues covering only those which concern 
departmental operations or control of the work force. NYSPIA's 
arguments in this respect are plainly at odds with the 
Legislature's intent. 
The original version of the bill adding the new §209.4(e) 
would have permitted arbitration regarding terms "relating to 
compensation". The word "directly" was added to the final 
version of the legislation, clearly manifesting the Legislature's 
intention to narrow the range of arbitrable subjects for members 
of the State Police to only some compensation issues, i.e., those 
directly relating to compensation. In 1995, for the first time, 
the Legislature extended to members of the State Police their own 
separate, unique and limited scope of arbitration, one not 
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defined at all by reference to the broader scope of arbitration 
available to other police officers. 
From our several observations to this point, we conclude 
that the correct interpretation of the phrase "directly relating 
to compensation" is one which makes a proposal arbitrable 
according to the degree of the relationship between the proposal 
and compensation. That is the only conclusion which can be drawn 
from the Legislature's use of the word "directly" in the phrase 
defining the subjects included within the scope of arbitration. 
All noncompensatory demands are excluded from compulsory 
arbitration under §209.4(e) because they necessarily have no 
relationship to compensation. This does not mean, however, as 
NYSPIA argues, that all compensatory issues are arbitrable unless 
their relationship to compensation is as attenuated as the 
subjects which are specifically listed as examples of 
noncompensatory issues. That argument drains all significance 
from the word "directly". The subjects excluded from arbitration 
under §209.4(e) do not define the subjects which are included 
because a subject must satisfy two conditions simultaneously to 
be arbitrable under §209.4(e). It must fall within the included 
compensatory category and fall without the excluded category of 
noncompensatory subjects. Even if a subject is not excluded from 
arbitration as noncompensatory, it is not necessarily arbitrable. 
A subject does not fit within the included category, even if it 
is compensatory in nature, unless it also "directly" relates to 
compensation. 
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The degree-of a demand's relationship to compensation is 
measured by the characteristic of the demand. If the sole, 
predominant or primary characteristic of the demand is 
compensation, then it is arbitrable because the demand to that 
extent directly relates to compensation. A demand has 
compensation as its sole, predominant or primary characteristic 
only when it seeks to effect some change in amount or level of 
compensation by either payment from the State to or on behalf of 
an employee or the modification of an employee's financial 
obligation arising from the employment relationship (e.g., a 
change in an insurance co-payment). If the effect is otherwise, 
then the relationship of the demand to compensation becomes 
secondary and indirect and the subject is, therefore, excluded 
from the scope of compulsory arbitration under the language of 
§209.4(e). 
Having outlined this general framework for analysis, we turn 
to the specific demands in issue. NYSPIA7s demands are logically 
and conveniently grouped into three categories for purposes of 
our discussion. 
Demands 10.11 and 13.8(B) would have the State absorb some 
or all education costs respectively for dependents of NYSPIA unit 
employees or for dependents of unit members who die in the line 
of duty. Demand 13.8(A) would have the State pay the funeral 
expenses incurred by the family of a unit employee who dies in 
the line of duty. 
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The AKT held these three demands nonarbitrable because they 
benefitted only the employees' dependents and they were 
contingent in nature. We reverse the ALJ's determination with 
respect to these three demands and conclude that they directly 
relate to compensation. 
These three demands are for a type of insurance and they are 
indistinguishable from "insurance, medical and hospitalization 
benefits" which are specifically included in §209.4(e) as 
arbitrable subjects. Neither the contingent nature of these 
benefits nor the identity of these beneficiaries can render these 
subjects nonarbitrable because the Legislature's list of 
arbitrable subjects specifically includes conditional benefits 
payable to other than the unit employees themselves. Without 
holding that every demand for insurance of any type is arbitrable 
as one directly related to compensation, we do hold that these 
demands under which the beneficiaries are members of the unit 
employee's immediate family are arbitrable. As these demands 
effect a change in the State's payments on behalf of employees 
and the persons whom they support financially, they directly 
relate to compensation and they are arbitrable under §209.4(e) of 
the Act. 
Proposals 12.2(B), 12.3, 13.1, 13.2 and 13.4 concern demands 
for time off from work without loss of pay. The ALJ held that 
these several demands did not directly relate to compensation 
because they were by nature demands primarily relating to hours 
of work. For the reasons which follow, we affirm the ALJ's 
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determination that these five demands are not arbitrable because 
they are not directly related to compensation. 
The effect of each of the time-off demands on compensation 
is clear, but is, nevertheless, only indirect. These demands 
seek simply to maintain salary or wages at a negotiated rate or 
level by disallowing a reduction in salary or wages due to an 
employee's absence from work for certain reasons. As they would 
not effect any change in compensation, the predominant or at 
least primary characteristic of these time-off demands is hours 
of work, a subject distinct from compensation for purposes of the 
Act. 
Our determination with respect to these five demands for 
paid time off from work has taken into account the legislative 
history of §209.4(e). An earlier version of the legislation 
specifically included "paid time off" as an arbitrable subject. 
Section 209.4(e) as enacted is silent as to that particular 
subject. If there were no other evidence of legislative intent, 
we would conclude from these facts that the Legislature intended 
to exempt demands for paid time off from work from the scope of 
compulsory arbitration under §209.4(e). It is extremely unlikely 
in our opinion that the Legislature would have deleted paid time 
off from the list of arbitrable subjects simply because it is 
arguably redundant of the phrase "directly relating to 
compensation" and yet retained a listing of several arbitrable 
subjects, all of which are equally susceptible to the same 
redundancy claim. However, a memorandum filed by a sponsor of 
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the amended Assembly bill covering the troopers and supervisory 
officers, which was identical to the bill covering the BCI 
employees, states that "vacation pay" is an arbitrable subject, 
notwithstanding the deletion of "paid time off" from the list of 
arbitrable subjects. There being no reasonable way to 
distinguish paid time off from work due to a vacation from paid 
time off from work for other reasons, we can only conclude that 
there is an apparent inconsistency in the legislative history on 
the issue of the arbitrability of demands for paid time off from 
work. We, therefore, find that the legislative history is 
unclear on the issue of the arbitrability of demands for paid 
time off from work. Without benefit of dispositive legislative 
history, we conclude that NYSPIA's time-off demands are not 
arbitrable because they are demands of a type relating 
predominantly or primarily to hours of work and only indirectly 
relating to compensation. 
The remaining proposals concern overtime compensation. 
Provisions in the parties' expired contract which deal with 
guaranteed overtime would be deleted and replaced with the 
language in proposed demands 12.1 and 12.10. Under proposal 
12.1, the basic workday would be fixed at eight hours and the 
basic workweek at forty hours. Overtime pay, keyed to an hourly 
rate of pay as defined in the proposal, would be owed after eight 
hours of work in any day or forty hours in any week or for work 
on a "pass" day. Under proposal 12.10, the hours of overtime, 
which were guaranteed under the provisions of the expired 
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contract, would be rolled into the employees' base pay and time 
worked in excess of the basic workweek as defined in proposal 
12.1 would be paid at a rate of one and one-half times the normal 
hourly rate. 
The ALT held these demands were not arbitrable because they 
were excluded under the phrase "issues relating to eligibility 
for overtime compensation." We disagree and hold that all of 
these overtime proposals are arbitrable. The interpretation 
urged by the State and adopted by the ALJ with respect to these 
overtime demands must be rejected as it is again in 
irreconcilable conflict with the wording of the statute and the 
relevant legislative history. 
Just as the phrase "directly relating to compensation" 
cannot reasonably be interpreted to mean only "direct 
compensation", so, too, the phrase "issues relating to 
eligibility for overtime compensation" cannot be read to exclude 
from the scope of arbitration all proposals for "overtime 
compensation". If the Legislature had intended to exclude 
overtime compensation from the scope of arbitration, it never 
would have qualified "overtime compensation" appearing in 
§209.4(e) with the words "issues relating to eligibility for". 
To reach the result urged by the State, we would have to ignore 
completely the introductory portion of the controlling phrase, 
which we may not do. 
The words "eligibility for" plainly refer to who among the 
unit employees would be eligible for or entitled to overtime pay. 
Any particular unit employee's eligibility for overtime was an 
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issue the Legislature wanted to be governed by the applicable 
law, just as were the other subjects listed as noncompensatory 
issues.-7 
The issues which NYSPIA seeks to define through its overtime 
proposals deal only with how much those unit employees who are 
determined to be eligible for overtime compensation under 
applicable law will be paid and the point at which their 
entitlement to overtime compensation will attach. The proposals 
do not seek to define who among the unit employees are eligible 
for overtime compensation. As these several demands otherwise 
plainly cover issues relating solely to the unit employees' 
personal compensation received directly from the State, and as 
they do not fall within the range of subjects which are excluded 
from arbitration, they are arbitrable under §209.4(e) as issues 
directly relating to compensation. 
Our conclusion regarding NYSPIA's overtime compensation 
demands is supported by legislative history. "Overtime" was 
listed in an earlier version of the bill as an arbitrable 
subject, but it was deleted from the list of arbitrable subjects 
in the amended bill. Had "overtime" simply been deleted, and not 
otherwise addressed, an argument could have been made that the 
Legislature intended overtime compensation to be a subject 
excluded from compulsory interest arbitration. However, by 
-'The phrase "which shall be governed by other provisions 
proscribed [sic] by law" was present before "issues relating to 
eligibility for overtime compensation" was added. Therefore, the 
concluding part of that phrase applies to all of the subjects 
which precede it, not simply eligibility for overtime 
compensation. 
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excluding from the list of noncompensatory issues only overtime 
"eligibility" issues, it must be concluded that the Legislature 
did not intend to exclude all overtime compensation issues from 
the scope of arbitration. Had it been the Legislature's intent 
to remove all overtime issues from arbitration, it would have 
simply deleted "overtime" from the list of arbitrable subjects 
and placed that word into the list of nonarbitrable subjects or, 
at the very least, it would not have addressed any aspect of 
overtime after it had deleted overtime from the list of 
arbitrable subjects. Moreover, the same Assembly sponsor's 
memorandum mentioned earlier, which addressed the version of the 
bill as enacted, specifically states that "overtime" is an 
arbitrable subject. The ALJ's decision regarding the 
arbitrability of the overtime demands simply cannot be reconciled 
with the sponsor's memorandum. 
For the reasons set forth above, the ALJ's decision is 
affirmed as to demands 12.2(B), 12.3, 13.1, 13.2 and 13.4. These 
five demands are not arbitrable within the meaning of §209.4(e) 
of the Act and NYSPIA is ordered to withdraw from arbitration 
those five enumerated demands. The ALJ's decision is reversed as 
to demands 10.11, 12.1, 12.10 (both), 12.10(A), 12.11, 13.8(A) 
and 13.8(B), and the charge in these respects must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: February 27, 1997 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kihsel1a f*E ihairperson 
~. Schmertz, Memfoer E r i c / j . c ertz, e f er 
APPENDIX 
ARTICLE 10.11-DEPENDANT'S [sic] EDUCATIONAL BENEFIT 
Dependents of members of this unit will be entitled to 
attend a school of the State University of New York (SUNY), 
tuition free for four years if accepted by the school. 
ARTICLE 12.1 (Proposed) 
The basic workweek for members of the Unit will be 40 hours, 
worked on five consecutive eight-hour tours or as otherwise 
agreed upon by the member and management. Members of this 
Unit eligible to earn overtime will be paid one and one half 
times the hourly rate for any time worked in excess of eight 
hours in a day or 40 hours in a week. Time during which a 
member is excused from work because of vacation, holidays, 
personal leave, sick leave at full pay, or any other leave 
at full pay will be considered as time worked for the 
purpose of computing overtime. Any work on a pass day will 
be at one and one half the normal hourly rate. Hourly rate 
will be computed by dividing base pay by 1992. 
ARTICLE 12.10-GUARANTEED OVERTIME 
Delete all existing language in this section. 
Effective at the beginning of the first scheduling period 
following May 20, 1993, a member of this Unit with the rank 
of Investigator shall be eligible to earn a minimum of 9-1/4 
hours overtime per twenty-nine (29) day work schedule, 
providing the member is eligible to earn overtime. 
Members shall be paid at a rate of one and one-half times 
their normal hourly rate of pay for overtime worked over 
41-1/4 hours per week, and such overtime earned during the 
29-day work schedule shall be accrued and deducted from the 
9-1/4 hour guaranteed minimum. At the conclusion of the 
first schedule, the remaining balance of earned but unused 
guaranteed hours shall be compiled and carried forward to 
the next work schedule. This process will continue through 
the third and subsequent work schedules, provided, however, 
upon conclusion of each succeeding 29-day work schedule, the 
remaining balance of guaranteed overtime hours in excess of 
27-3/4 must be utilized during the current work schedule in 
which the excess occurs. This process shall be continued 
for each 29-day schedule. 
-2-
Members of this Unit with the rank of Investigator may opt, 
at least ten days prior to each work schedule, whether or 
not they wish to participate in the Program. It shall be 
assumed that, upon implementation of the Program, all such 
members have opted to participate, unless they file a 
memorandum declining participation. Such declination shall 
remain in effect until a subsequent memorandum is submitted 
requesting inclusion in the Program, commencing with the 
next work schedule. If a member otherwise eligible to 
continue in the Program opts out of the Program, the member 
shall be afforded the opportunity to work the balance of 
overtime hours owed as a result of this Program. 
Non-participation in this Program shall not affect in any 
way, nor prohibit, management's right to assign non-
participating members to work, consistent with the 
operational needs of this Division as determined by the 
Troop or Detail Commander. Further, nothing in this 
provision shall be construed as to prohibit management's 
right to assign overtime at any time or apply guaranteed 
overtime, if applicable, at any time, consistent with this 
Agreement and the operational needs of the Division as 
determined by the Troop or Detail Commander. 
Once implemented, the Guaranteed Overtime Program will 
continue; provided, however, in the event upon appeal of the 
decision of the United States District Judge in Ahem v. 
State of New York, et al.. Long v. Thomas Constantine, et 
al., Moran v. State of New York, and Martin v. State of New 
York, dated December 8, 1992, investigators are determined 
to be FLSA ineligible, or that the FLSA is inapplicable to 
the BCI, the Program will cease at the expiration of the 
Agreement, or if that is not possible, given the timing of 
the decision, as soon as practicable thereafter, and the 
10.4 Compensation in Lieu of Overtime system will be 
reactivitated [sic] and will govern overtime compensation, 
except as provided for in Article 12.8A. The amount of 10.4 
Compensation in Lieu of Overtime shall be $5,760 increased 
by the ATB percentage in 3A, 3B and 3C. Conversely, if some 
or all Senior Investigators are determined to be FLSA 
eligible, the 10.4 Compensation in Lieu of Overtime system 
will cease for those Senior Investigators, and a Guaranteed 
Overtime Program will commence (comparable to 
investigators.) 
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Day-to-day problem areas involving the Guaranteed Overtime 
Program may be discussed in labor/management meetings. 
Further, six months after the program is implemented, a 
joint labor/management committee, consisting of two members 
appointed by the State and two members appointed by the PBA, 
shall be established to jointly evaluate the program to 
resolve problems with the program that might arise and to 
make recommendations to improve the program as needed. The 
parties agree that appropriate modifications, jointly agreed 
to, may be implemented during the term of this Agreement. 
ARTICLE 12.10-GUARANTEED OVERTIME (Proposed) 
Effective April 1, 1995, the guaranteed overtime program is 
discontinued and the equivalent of the 9 1/4 hours of 
guaranteed overtime per 29 day schedule will be rolled in to 
the base pay. Any time worked in excess of the basic work 
schedule as defined in 12.1 will be paid as overtime at the 
rate of one and one half times the normal hourly rate. 
ARTICLE 12.10(A) 
Delete all existing language in this section. 
For Members overtime eligible - time worked on a pass day 
will not be deducted from accrued overtime hours compiled 
under the guaranteed overtime program. However, a member 
who does not meet the 41-1/4 hours per week criteria and who 
is recalled on a pass day will have the pass day 
rescheduled. 
ARTICLE 12.11 
Delete all existing language in this section. 
Effective with the implementation of the 41-1/4 hour basic 
workweek, overtime shall be calculated by dividing basic 
annual salary and other compensation elements, as 
appropriate, by 2,062-1/2 rather than 2,000. Further, in 
the event upon appeal of the decision of the United States 
District Judge in Ahern v. State of New York, et al.. Long 
v. Thomas Constantine, et al., Moran v. State of New York 
and Martin v. State of New York, dated December 8, 1992, 
Investigators are determined to be FLSA ineligible, or that 
the FLSA is inapplicable to the BCI, the 41-1/4 hour 
workweek and salary adjustment will cease at the expiration 
of the Agreement, and the 10.4 Compensation in Lieu of 
Overtime system will be reactivated as described in Article 
12.10 and will govern overtime compensation except as 
provided for in Article 12.8A. 
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Conversely, if some or all Senior Investigators are 
determined to be FLSA eligible, the 41-1/4 hour basip 
workweek with commensurate salary adjustment shall be 
implemented for those Senior Investigators covered by FLSA. 
ARTICLE 12.2 
B. Holidays are: New Years Day, Lincoln's Birthday, 
Washington's Birthday, Memorial Day, Flag Day, Independence 
Day, Labor Day, Columbus Day, Election Day, Veteran's Day, 
Thanksgiving Day, Christmas day, Martin Luther King Jr. Day. 
Pass days will be increased to 120 days plus the 13 
holidays. A member who works on a holiday will be given 
back another pass day or another day of compensation at 
straight time as requested by the member. 
ARTICLE 12.3 
Each member of this Unit will be entitled to one meal period 
in each regular tour of duty not to exceed one-half hour. 
ARTICLE 13.1 
(1) After 20 years of service, a member of this Unit will 
be credited with 40 vacation days. 
ARTICLE 13.2-SICK LEAVE ACCUMULATION 
(1) Sick Leave will accrue at the rate of 2 6 days each 
year. 
(2) Sick leave credits accrue to a maximum of 300 days. 
ARTICLE 13.4 BEREAVEMENT LEAVE 
Members will be granted a four-day bereavement leave with 
full pay and not charged to any other leave in the event of 
the death of the member's spouse, parent, sibling, child, 
father-in-law, mother-in-law, grandparent, stepchild or 
stepparent. Similarly, a two-day. uncharged leave for the 
death of a grand child, son-in-law, daughter-in-law, 
brother-in-law, sister-in-law, stepchild, foster child, 
half-brother, half-sister, nieces, nephews, uncles, aunts 
and cousins provided that in the case of the two-day leave, 
the member actually attends the funeral of the decedent. 
ARTICLE 13.8(A) DEATH BENEFITS 
The State will pay all funeral expenses incurred by the 
family of a Member who dies in the line of duty. 
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ARTICLE 13.8(B) 
Dependents of a Member who dies in the line of duty, who are 
accepted to a New York State University for their 
undergraduate study will attend at the expense of the State. 
The expense will be limited to tuition, board, full meal 
plan and books. This benefit will continue for four years 
dependent on the student's successful completion of each 
semester as determined by SUNY. If the dependent decides to 
attend a different college or University, he will be 
compensated at the rate it would have cost for full time 
attendance at SUNY Albany. 

STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, TOWN OF 
CLARENCE UNIT OF LOCAL 815, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-17333 
TOWN OF CLARENCE, 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (ROBERT REILLY of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
NICHOLAS J. SARGENT, ESQ., for Respondent 
AMENDED BOARD DECISION AND ORDER-1 
This case comes to us on exceptions to a decision of an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) finding that the Town of Clarence 
(Town) violated §209-a.l(d) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally consolidated coffee 
breaks of its Water Department employees who are in a unit 
•^ On January 29, 1997, we issued a decision in this case, 
Town of Clarence (unpublished). Our decision this date is 
identical to the earlier decision except that it deletes from 
that decision "For the first time in its exceptions,". As the 
Town's counsel has correctly pointed out to us, the quoted 
language from the earlier decision inadvertently mischaracterized 
the timing of the Town's argument, which had in fact been made to 
the ALJ. Although the outcome is not affected, the decision 
issued this date has corrected the error made in the. unpublished 
decision. 
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represented by the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., 
Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Town of Clarence Unit of Local 815 
(CSEA). 
After a hearing, the ALT determined that the Town had 
unilaterally consolidated two fifteen-minute coffee breaks, one 
taken by unit employees in the morning and one in the afternoon, 
into one thirty-minute coffee break to be taken in the morning. 
Although the Town alleged in its answer that the management 
rights clause in its 1992-95 collective bargaining agreement with 
CSEA waived CSEA's right to negotiate the change, the AKT, 
determining that the language was too broad to evidence a clear 
and knowing waiver of CSEA's bargaining rights, found that the 
Town had violated §209-a.1(d) of the Act. 
The Town excepts to the ALT's decision, arguing that it was 
not required to bargain its decision to consolidate coffee breaks 
because the change did not increase the employees' workday or 
significantly increase their work load. CSEA supports the ALJ's 
decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and a consideration of 
the parties' arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
Paid time off from work in the form of coffee breaks is 
mandatorily negotiable.-7 The Town's contractual management 
rights clause gives it the right "to direct, deploy and utilize 
the work force....11 The ALJ rejected the Town's waiver defense, 
finding that the language relied on by the Town was far too broad 
g/Inc. Village of Rockville Centre, 18 PERB J[3082 (1985) . 
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to establish a knowing and meaningful waiver of CSEA's right to 
negotiate the change in the scheduling of the coffee breaks. We 
affirm the ALJ's finding in this regard. The Town's management 
rights clause is "nonspecific and too general to operate as a 
plain and clear waiver of bargaining rights"-7 in this regard. 
The Town argues that any change in break time which does not 
increase the employees' workday or their work load is not 
mandatorily negotiable and that, therefore, the charge should be 
dismissed. This argument is without merit. Absent a meritorious 
defense, a unilateral change in a mandatory subject of 
negotiations violates the Act, whether or not the change affects 
the length of the workday or work load.-7 The number of times 
employees are released from their job duties for rest and 
refreshment are themselves mandatorily negotiable subjects. By 
unilaterally consolidating two fifteen-minute coffee breaks into 
a single thirty-minute coffee break, the Town violated §209-
a.l(d) of the Act. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Town's exceptions are denied 
and the decision of the ALT is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Town: 
1. Restore the practice of one fifteen-minute coffee break 
in the morning and one fifteen-minute coffee break in the 
afternoon previously enjoyed by Water Department employees. 
g/Ulster County Sheriff. 27 PERB f3028, at 3069 (1994). 
-
7See, e.g.
 f Town of Smithtown, 25 PERB [^3081 (1992) ; City 
of Auburn. 23 PERB 13044 (1990); County of Yates. 22 PERB f3017 
(1989). 
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2. Sign and post the attached notice in all locations at 
which notices of information to unit employees are 
ordinarily posted.-7 
DATED: February 27, 1997 
Albany, New York 
£J>^ < fv J 
Pauline R. 'Kinsella, Chairperson 
Eric Jf. Schmertz, Member 
-'while the AKT ordered the Town to negotiate in good faith 
with CSEA concerning the number of coffee breaks taken by unit 
employees in the Water Department, we have deleted this portion 
pursuant to our decision in Middle Country Cent. Sch. Dist., 23 
PERB [^3045 (1990) . 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the Town of Clarence Water Department (Town) in the unit represented by the Civil Service 
Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Town of Clarence Unit of Local 815 that the Town will restore 
the practice of one fifteen-minute coffee break in the morning and one fifteen-minute coffee break in the afternoon previously 
enjoyed by Water Department employees. 
) 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
TOWN OF CLARENCE 
T Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered 
by dhy other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CITY OP PULTON, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-17687 
FULTON FIRE FIGHTERS ASSOCIATION, 
LOCAL 3063, IAFF, AFL-CIO, 
Respondent. 
ROEMER, WALLENS & MINEAUX, LLP (ELAYNE G. GOLD of counsel), 
for Charging Party 
BLITMAN & KING LLP (CHARLES E. BLITMAN Of counsel), for 
Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the City of 
Fulton (City) to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) 
on the City's charge against the Fulton Fire Fighters 
Association, Local 3063, IAFF, AFL-CIO (Association). The City 
alleges that the Association violated §209-a.2(b) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) by submitting three 
nonmandatory demands to interest arbitration. The ALJ held two 
of the demands to be nonmandatory subjects of negotiation and 
ordered those two demands withdrawn from arbitration. No 
exceptions have been filed to this part of the ALJ's decision. 
The ALJ found a third demand to be mandatory and dismissed the 
charge in that respect. It is the dismissal of the charge as to 
that third demand to which the City excepts. 
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The Association's demand 11 provides as follows: 
In the event that less than the below listed staffing 
level is maintained, each bargaining unit employee on 
duty during such lesser staffing levels shall receive a 
lump sum payment of $200.00 per shift, in the 
employee's weekly pay, for each bargaining unit 
employee that does not work according to the below 
listed staffing level. 
Staff of 38 employees consisting of: 
1 Assistant Chief 
4 Captains 
4 Lieutenants 
29 Firefighters 
and, a staff of eight (8) bargaining unit employees on 
duty during all shifts. 
The City argues that this demand is nonmandatory because it 
is one for a minimum staffing level. The Association has not 
responded to the City's exceptions. We affirm the ALJ's 
decision. 
As the ALT held, the demand in issue is not one for a 
staffing level but one for a rate of compensation tied to the 
staffing level fixed by the City. The Association is not 
requiring the City to establish or maintain any staffing level. 
The City remains free to fix its staffing at whatever level it 
chooses. If the staffing were to fall below certain specified 
levels, however, the employees working the short shift would be 
paid additional money pursuant to the Association's demand. This 
demand is one for hazardous duty pay, safety pay, or increased 
workload pay, all clearly mandatory subjects of negotiation.-' 
^See, e.g. , West Irondecruoit Teachers Ass'n v. Helsby, 
35 N.Y.2d 46, 7 PERB ^7014 (1974)(workload compensation); 
Town of Carmel. 29 PERB f3026, conf'd. 29 PERB 1[7016 (Sup. Ct. 
Alb. Co. 1996) (safety stipends); International Ass'n of 
Firefighters, Local 189. 11 PERB f3087 (compensation linked 
to employer's staffing determinations). 
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Although the Association's demand would create an economic 
disincentive for the City to staff at levels below those 
specified in the demand, that does not convert the nature of the 
demand from one seeking only compensation for services rendered 
to one establishing a minimum staffing level. If demands for 
compensation were rendered nonmandatory because they influenced 
the exercise of some managerial prerogative, then very few, if 
any, monetary demands would be mandatorily negotiable. 
Similarly, the amount of compensation being sought is immaterial 
to the negotiability of the demand, whether it is considered 
reasonable or extraordinary. The reasonableness of any demand is 
for resolution by the parties in negotiations or through the 
statutory impasse procedures, not by this Board in the context of 
an improper practice charge. 
For the reasons set forth above, the City's exceptions are 
denied and the ALJ's decision holding the Association's demand 11 
to be mandatorily negotiable is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge with respect to 
demand 11 must be, and it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: February 27, 1997 
Albany, New York 
uU.in,e R. Kinsella, Chai rperson 
Eric Jf. Schmertz, Membe'r 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NFTA PUBLIC SAFETY OFFICERS BENEVOLENT 
ASSOCIATION, 
Applicant, 
-and- CASE NO. M-96-014 
NIAGARA FRONTIER TRANSPORTATION 
AUTHORITY, 
Employer. 
WALSH, FLEMING & CHIACCHIA, P.C. (ANDREW P. FLEMING Of 
counsel), for Applicant 
ERNEST J. GAWINSKI, ESQ., for Employer 
) BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us upon application by the NFTA Public 
Safety Officers Benevolent Association (Association) to review 
the Director of Conciliation's (Director) determination that the 
aircraft rescue fire fighters employed by the Niagara Frontier 
Transportation Authority (NFTA) are not eligible for compulsory 
interest arbitration under §209.4 of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act). The Director determined that the 
compulsory interest arbitration provisions of the Act do not 
apply to the employees of a public authority, such as the NFTA, 
even if they perform fire fighting duties. Noting that the only 
employees of a public authority who are eligible for interest 
arbitration had eligibility extended to them under a specific 
^ proviso to §209.4, the Director concluded that compulsory 
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interest arbitration is otherwise available only to the employees 
of a county, city,-7 town, village or fire district. 
The Association argues that the employees it represents at 
NFTA are entitled to interest arbitration under the 1988 
"Syracuse Hancock" fire fighters amendment to §209.4. NFTA 
argues that the cited amendment to §209.4 only applies to a 
municipal employer which replaces its fire fighters with other 
employees of its own who are not members of an organized fire 
department and then continues to deliver through those 
replacements the services its fire fighters had previously 
performed for it. 
Having considered the parties' arguments, we affirm the 
Director's determination that NFTA's aircraft rescue fire 
fighters are not eligible for compulsory interest arbitration 
under §209.4 of the Act. 
Until 1988, interest arbitration under §209.4 was available 
to "officers or members of any organized fire department, police 
force or police department of any county, city, except the City 
of New York, town, village or fire or police district". In that 
year, §209.4 was amended to insert after "fire department," the 
following: "or any other unit of the public employer which 
previously was a part of an organized fire department whose 
primary mission includes the prevention and control of aircraft 
fires,..." 
^Except the City of New York, which is specifically exempted 
from §209.4. 
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The 1988 amendment was admittedly and unquestionably a 
response to our decision,-7 as confirmed,-7 involving rescue 
workers at the City of Syracuse's Hancock Airport. 
Hancock Airport is a municipal airport owned by the City of 
Syracuse (City). For many years, the City assigned its fire 
fighters to duties at the Airport involving aircraft crash 
rescue, aircraft fire fighting and general fire fighting. In 
1969, the City created the new civil service position of rescue 
worker, new employees were hired by the City for that position, 
and the City removed its fire fighters from the Airport and 
returned them to its fire department. In 1983, the union 
representing the rescue workers reached an impasse in 
negotiations with the City and it petitioned the local mini-PERB 
for statutory interest arbitration. The mini-PERB did not 
process the petition on the ground that the rescue workers were 
not members of an organized fire department. Upon review of that 
determination, the Board also held that §209.4 of the Act did not 
apply to the City's rescue workers because they were not members 
of an organized fire department. The Appellate Division, Third 
Department, confirmed that determination. 
In 1987, Governor Cuomo vetoed legislation that would have 
extended interest arbitration to any public employees of a public 
employer who performed fire fighting duties because that 
-
7Syracuse Hancock Professional Fire Fighters Ass'n, 17 PERB 
13105. 
57110 A.D.2d 256, 18 PERB 57014 (3d Dep't 1985), motion for leave 
to appeal denied. 67 N.Y.2d 605, 19 PERB 57009 (1986). 
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legislation went beyond the circumstances involving Syracuse 
Hancock Airport. In his veto message, Governor Cuomo stated that 
a bill "that deals cleanly and clearly with the Hancock Airport 
Fire Department type of situation" would be approved.-1 The 
1988 legislation was submitted in response to that veto. In 
recommending approval, Counsel to the Governor's Office of 
Employee Relations wrote that the bill would not "inadvertently 
extend ... binding arbitration provisions" to groups of public 
employees other than "firefighters [sic] and police officers 
employed by any local government ...." 
Although the 1988 amendment is less clean and clear than it 
might have been, we believe that the Legislature's intent is 
evident. The Legislature intended the 1988 amendment to §209.4 
to cover only the circumstances involved in the Syracuse Hancock 
Airport case. Legislation broader than that had been vetoed a 
year earlier. The controlling circumstance at Hancock Airport 
was the municipality's decision to replace its fire fighters with 
other of its own employees in a different title to continue 
substantially the same services as had been provided previously 
by members of that municipality's organized fire department. The 
Legislature clearly did not want a covered municipality to be 
able to avoid the interest arbitration provisions of the Act 
simply by transferring fire fighter duties away from a unit 
staffed with its fire department employees to a fire fighting 
^Veto Message No. 23, 1987 NYS Legislative Annual 314. 
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unit in another of its departments whose employees were not 
members of an organized fire department. 
The circumstances in this case are not at all similar to 
those involving the Syracuse Hancock Airport. Here there are two 
entirely different public employers, one of which is not a 
municipality covered under §209.4. The City of Buffalo's fire 
fighters had done fire fighting for NFTA under contract, but the 
City of Buffalo stopped doing so years ago, when the NFTA assumed 
that responsibility directly through its own employees. This 
case does not involve a single covered municipality's inter-
departmental reassignment of fire fighting duties, which is all 
the Legislature addressed in the 1988 Syracuse Hancock amendment. 
As the Director observed, our conclusion that the NFTA's 
aircraft rescue fire fighters are not eligible for statutory 
interest arbitration is further supported, if not compelled, by 
the actual wording of the 1988 amendment and its positioning 
within §209.4. 
The reference to "the" "public employer" in the first line 
of the 1988 amendment can only reasonably refer to the several 
different municipalities identified in §209.4 of the Act. When 
the 1988 amendment was added, there were no public authorities 
referenced in §209.4. The addition of the New York City Transit 
police did not occur until 1989.-7 Therefore, the Legislature 
could not have intended in 1988 to extend interest arbitration to 
^1989 N.Y. Laws ch. 587 (approved and effective July 21, 1989). 
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the employees of public authorities generally, as no public 
authority was then covered under §209.4. 
Moreover, if the Legislature had intended to cover any and 
all public employers which provided fire fighting services 
through its employees, then it would likely have chosen an 
indefinite article such as "a" or "an" to qualify "public 
employer" in the opening line of the amendment rather than "the". 
The use of the word "the" preceding "public employer" strongly 
suggests and confirms that the Legislature was concerned only 
with a municipality, such as the City of Syracuse, which was 
seeking to avoid arbitration by the expedient of substituting 
rescue workers, or other employees, who are not members of an 
organized fire department, to carry on duties previously rendered 
by its fire fighters who were eligible for interest arbitration. 
Furthermore, the language in the 1988 amendment to §209.4 
was inserted after the words "organized fire department," and 
before the listing of the several types of covered municipal 
governments. That listing of governments clearly, therefore, 
modifies all of the language that precedes it, including the 1988 
amendment, establishing that all of §209.4 applies only to the 
governments listed. The subsequent extension by specific proviso 
in 1989 of interest arbitration to the one and only public 
authority referenced in §209.4 reinforces the conclusion that the 
Legislature did not intend by the 1988 amendment that impasses 
involving employees of other public authorities be resolved 
through the Act's interest arbitration provisions, even if the 
fire services rendered by those employees are similar to those 
Board - M-96-014 -7 
once rendered by the members of an organized fire department of a 
different employer. If the performance of fire fighting duties 
for a public employer was to control eligibility for interest 
arbitration, then the 1987 legislation would have been enacted. 
That legislation was vetoed and much narrower legislation was 
enacted a year later. 
In summary, the 1988 Syracuse Hancock amendment to §209.4 
does not extend interest arbitration to the employees of public 
authorities who are engaged in some fire fighting duties. The 
1988 legislation is limited and intended to prevent a covered 
municipality from avoiding interest arbitration by transferring 
responsibilities for certain fire fighting duties from its fire 
department to another of its departments which it has staffed 
with employees in titles other than fire fighter who continue to 
deliver the services previously rendered by its fire fighters. 
For the reasons set forth above, the Director's 
determination that the NFTA aircraft rescue fire fighters are not 
eligible for interest arbitration under §209.4 of the Act is 
affirmed. SO ORDERED. 
DATED: February 27, 1997 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Eric JXSchmertz, Membe^ 
A STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION, LOCAL 1342, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-16779 
NIAGARA FRONTIER METRO SYSTEM, INC., 
Respondent. 
COLLINS, COLLINS & KANTOR, P.C. (JOSEPH E. O'DONNELL of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
ERNEST J. GAWINSKI, ESQ., for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case-7 comes to us on exceptions filed by the 
Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1342 (ATU) to a decision by an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). ATU's charge against the Niagara 
Frontier Metro System, Inc. (Metro) alleges that Metro 
subcontracted a bus run to Buffalo Motor Bus, Ltd., which later 
became Buffalo Transit, Inc. (BMBT). The route in issue was 
between the City of Tonawanda and the Amherst Campus of the State 
University of New York at Buffalo, a route designated by BMBT as 
"151 Sheridan". After a hearing, the ALJ dismissed the charge. 
The ALJ concluded that 151 Sheridan was never Metro's route, that 
Metro did not have a route comparable to 151 Sheridan, and that 
i'This case was consolidated with U-17552 for hearing. No 
exceptions have been taken to the decision dismissing the charge 
in U-17552. 
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Metro did not have any control over BMBT's operations generally 
or as to 151 Sheridan specifically, notwithstanding a "transfer 
exchange agreement" between Metro and BMBT. 
ATU argues that certain terms of the transfer exchange 
agreement gave Metro sufficient control over BMBT's 151 Sheridan 
route to make BMBT's operations with respect to that route an 
improper unilateral subcontract by Metro of ATU's unit work. 
Metro argues in response that the ALJ's decision is correct and 
should be affirmed. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the ALJ's decision. 
Metro cannot be found to have improperly subcontracted unit 
work unless BMBT is Metro's agent for the delivery of Metro's bus 
services. For the reasons given by the ALT, BMBT is not Metro's 
agent for the delivery of service on 151 Sheridan. That route 
was never Metro's; indeed, Metro did not have a route even 
comparable to 151 Sheridan. Although parts of BMBT's 151 
Sheridan route ran along certain of Metro's bus routes, a person 
could travel on Metro from Tonawanda to the SUNY Amherst Campus 
only by making a number of transfers along different routes. The 
establishment, operation and ultimate discontinuation of 151 
Sheridan were business decisions made solely by BMBT and without 
input or approval by Metro. As the ALT found, BMBT established 
its own standards of operation, it alone began and ended its 
routes, it fixed its days and hours of operation and its level of 
fares, it purchased its own equipment and it hired its own staff. 
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Metro paid nothing to BMBT for it to operate 151 Sheridan and 
BMBT paid nothing to Metro to establish that route. BMBT is an 
independent carrier in competition with Metro, not an agent of 
Metro, for the delivery of Metro's services. 
Despite these facts, ATU argues that the transfer exchange 
agreement establishes enough control by Metro over 151 Sheridan 
to make BMBT's operation of that route with employees who are not 
in ATU's unit an improper practice by Metro. That agreement, in 
relevant part, permits BMBT to use two of Metro's facilities for 
the layover of its buses when those facilities are not required 
for Metro operations. This conditional permission to use 
property, however, is no different from that in Town of 
Brookhaven.^ where we held that the Town's grant of permission 
to nonunit persons to remove, transport, set up, use and return 
the Town's portable dance floor did not constitute an 
impermissible transfer of unit work. Although the transfer 
exchange agreement also provides that BMBT's vehicles and 
employees may be subject to direction by Metro's supervisory 
personnel, this direction applies only when BMBT is using Metro's 
facilities. This part of the transfer exchange agreement merely 
obligates BMBT to obey Metro's rules regarding facility use if it 
wants to use Metro's property. No more so than Metro's grant of 
a limited right to BMBT to use its property, the reguirement that 
BMBT obey Metro's rules and directions pertaining to the use of 
^28 PERB 53010(1995). 
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that property does not evidence or establish that Metro controls 
BMBT's operations in any way. 
For the reasons set forth above, ATU's exceptions are denied 
and the ALJ's decision is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: February 27, 1997 
Albany, New York 
K^.K^—X- 'H [t\U\\L. 
Pauline R. Kinse l la , Chairperson 
Eric ji. Schmertz, Membe 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LOCAL 342, LONG ISLAND PUBLIC SERVICE 
EMPLOYEES, UNITED MARINE DIVISION, ILA, 
APL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
- and - CASE NO. C-4596 
BETHPAGE FIRE DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
WILLIAM HENNESSEY, for Petitioner 
SAL SAPIENZA, for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On October 11, 1996, Local 342, Long Island Public Service 
Employees, United Marine Division, ILA, AFL-CIO (petitioner), 
filed, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the Public 
Employment Relations Board, a timely petition seeking certifi-
cation as the exclusive representative of certain employees of 
the Bethpage Fire District. 
Thereafter, the parties executed a consent agreement in 
which they stipulated that the following negotiating unit was 
appropriate: 
Included: All full-time and permanent part-time: 
Automotive Mechanic, Cleaner, Dispatcher, 
Firehouse Maintainer and Senior Firehouse 
Maintainer. 
Excluded: Elected officials, District Superintendent, 
District Treasurer, District Secretary and all 
others. 
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Pursuant to that agreement, a secret-ballot election was 
held on January 30, 1997, at which a majority of ballots were 
cast against representation by the petitioner. 
Inasmuch as the results of the election indicate that a 
majority of the eligible voters in the unit who cast ballots do 
not desire to be represented by the petitioner for the purpose o 
collective negotiation, IT IS ORDERED that the petition must be, 
and it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: February 27, 1997 
Albany, New York 
iiiline R. Kinsella, Paulin Chairperson 
^CY^tx^^-
Eric J. /g'chmertz, Member-
